Second Treatise of Government (Updated Translation)

Book Summary

John Locke's "Second Treatise of Government" (1689) stands as one of the most influential works in political philosophy, profoundly shaping modern concepts of individual rights, limited government, and civil society. Written during England's Glorious Revolution, the work presents a systematic theory of political authority based on natural rights and social contract theory.

The treatise begins by examining the state of nature, where all people are naturally free and equal, bound only by reason and natural law. Unlike Hobbes's brutal state of nature, Locke presents it as generally peaceful but unstable, lacking formal institutions to protect rights and resolve disputes.

Locke argues that property rights exist in the state of nature, derived from the natural right to self-preservation and the mixing of one's labor with natural resources. This theory of property becomes crucial to his political philosophy, as government's primary purpose becomes the protection of life, liberty, and property.

The work explains how civil society forms through social contract, with individuals consenting to give up certain natural rights to secure the rest. Locke emphasizes that political power originates from the people, who retain the right to withdraw their consent if government fails to protect their rights or exceeds its authority.

A significant portion of the text addresses the limits of political power. Locke argues for separation of powers, particularly between legislative and executive functions. He emphasizes that all political power must serve the public good and remain within the bounds of natural law.

The treatise famously defends the right of revolution when government betrays its trust. Locke argues that if rulers violate natural rights or abuse their power, the people have not only a right but a duty to resist and establish new government. This argument profoundly influenced both the American and French Revolutions.

Throughout the work, Locke develops key concepts that became foundational to liberal democracy, including consent of the governed, religious tolerance, rule of law, and natural rights. His ideas about private property and limited government significantly influenced modern capitalism and constitutional democracy.

Second Treatise of Government (Modern, Updated Translation)

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Introduction

Reader, you have here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning government; what fate has otherwise done with the papers that should have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, is not worth telling you. These remaining parts, I hope, are enough to establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to validate his title through the consent of the people, which being the only legitimate basis for all lawful governments, he possesses more fully and clearly than any prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England, whose love for their just and natural rights, along with their determination to preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the brink of slavery and ruin. If these papers contain the evidence I flatter myself is within them, there will be no great loss of those which are missing, and my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have neither the time nor inclination to repeat my efforts and fill in the missing part of my answer by tracing Sir Robert again through all the windings and obscurities found in the various branches of his remarkable system. The king and the body of the nation have since so thoroughly refuted his hypothesis, that I suppose no one hereafter will have either the confidence to oppose our common safety and advocate for slavery again, or the weakness to be deceived by contradictions dressed up in a popular style and well-turned phrases: for if anyone will take the effort, themselves, in those parts which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert’s discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavor to reduce his words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare them with one another, they will quickly be satisfied that there was never so much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English. If they think it not worth examining his works all through, let them experiment in that part where he discusses usurpation; and let them try whether they can, with all their skill, make Sir Robert intelligible and consistent with himself or common sense. I would not speak so plainly of a gentleman long since unable to answer, had not the pulpit, in recent years, publicly endorsed his doctrine and made it the prevailing divinity of the times. It is necessary for those men, who take on themselves to be teachers and have so dangerously misled others, to be openly shown the authority of this patriarch they have so blindly followed, so they may either retract what they have promoted on such poor grounds and cannot sustain, or else justify those principles they preached as gospel; even though they had no better an author than an English courtier: for I would not have written against Sir Robert, or taken the effort to show his mistakes, inconsistencies, and lack of (what he so much boasts of and pretends to wholly build on) scripture-proofs, were there not men among us who, by praising his books and adopting his doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary. They have been so zealous in this point that, if I have done him any wrong, I cannot hope they would spare me. I wish, where they have wronged the truth and the public, they would be as ready to correct it and give due weight to this reflection, namely, that there cannot be a greater mischief done to prince and people than propagating wrong notions concerning government; so that at last all times might not have reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic. If anyone, truly concerned for truth, undertakes the refutation of my hypothesis, I promise to either recant my mistake upon fair conviction or to answer their difficulties. But they must remember two things.

First, nitpicking at some expression or minor incident in my discourse here and there is not a valid response to my book.

Secondly, I will not mistake insults for arguments, nor consider either of these worth my attention. However, I will always feel obligated to provide clarity to anyone who seems genuinely concerned about the issue and presents valid reasons for their concerns.

I have nothing more to add, except to inform the reader that "Observations" refers to "Observations on Hobbs, Milton, etc." and that any simple page number reference always indicates pages from his "Patriarcha," 1680 edition.

Chapter 1: An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent, and Purpose of Civil Government

Section 1. It having been shown in the previous discussion,

(1) That Adam did not have, either by natural right of fatherhood or by a specific grant from God, any such authority over his children or dominion over the world, as is claimed:

(2) That even if he had, his heirs still had no right to it:

(3) That if his heirs had, since there is no natural law nor explicit law from God that determines who the rightful heir is in all possible situations, the right of succession, and consequently the right to rule, could not have been clearly determined:

(4). That even if that had been determined, the knowledge of which is the oldest line of Adam's descendants has been lost for so long that, among the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains no claim for one above another to be the oldest house and to have the right of inheritance:

Given that all these premises have been clearly established, it is impossible for the current rulers on earth to gain any benefit or derive even the slightest hint of authority from what is considered the source of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal jurisdiction. Therefore, anyone who does not want to suggest that all government in the world is solely the result of force and violence, and that people live together by no other rules than those of beasts, where the strongest prevails, thereby laying a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion (things that the proponents of that hypothesis so loudly oppose), must necessarily discover another origin of government, another source of political power, and another method of identifying and recognizing those who possess it, different from what Sir Robert Filmer has taught us.

Section 2. For this purpose, I think it might be helpful to explain what I consider to be political power, so that the power of a magistrate over a subject can be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife, and a lord over his slave. Since all these distinct powers can sometimes occur together in the same person, if we consider him in these different roles, it may help us to distinguish these powers from one another, as well as from the roles of a wealthy person, a family patriarch, and a ship captain.

Section 3. Political power, then, I understand to be the right to make laws with penalties up to and including death, and consequently all lesser penalties, for the regulation and preservation of property, and to use the community's force in enforcing these laws and defending the commonwealth from foreign harm; all of this solely for the public good.

Chapter 2: On the State of Nature.

Section 4. To properly understand political power and trace it back to its origins, we must consider the natural state all humans are in, which is a state of complete freedom to organize their actions and manage their possessions and themselves as they see fit, within the limits of natural law, without needing permission or relying on the will of anyone else.

A state of equality, where all power and authority are mutual, with no one having more than another; it is clear that creatures of the same species and rank, born with the same natural advantages and the use of the same abilities, should also be equal among one another without hierarchy or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by a clear declaration of his will, place one above another, and grant him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undeniable right to rule and sovereignty.

Section 5. This natural equality of men, as observed by the insightful Hooker, is considered so self-evident and indisputable that he uses it as the foundation for the obligation of mutual love among people. From this, he constructs the duties they owe to one another and derives the great principles of justice and charity. His words are:

The same natural inclination has led people to understand that it is equally their duty to love others as they love themselves. For, considering that things which are equal must all have one measure, if I cannot help but wish to receive good from every person, just as much as anyone can wish for their own soul, how can I expect to have any part of my desire fulfilled unless I am careful to satisfy the same desire that undoubtedly exists in others, who are of the same nature? To have anything offered to them that goes against this desire must necessarily upset them as much as it would upset me. Therefore, if I cause harm, I must expect to suffer, as there is no reason others should show me more love than I have shown them. My desire, therefore, to be loved by my equals in nature as much as possible imposes on me a natural duty to bear the same affection toward them. From this relationship of equality between ourselves and those who are like us, natural reason has derived various rules and principles for guiding life, which no one is unaware of, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.

Section 6. Although this is a state of liberty, it is not a state of license: even though a person in this state has the uncontrollable freedom to manage their own person or possessions, they do not have the freedom to destroy themselves or any creature in their possession, except when a higher purpose than mere preservation demands it. The state of nature is governed by a law of nature, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all of humanity, who will only consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one should harm another in their life, health, liberty, or possessions. Since all people are the creation of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker, all are servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order and about his business; they are his property, whose creation they are, made to last during his, not one another’s pleasure. Being equipped with similar faculties, sharing in one community of nature, there cannot be assumed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another’s uses, as the lower ranks of creatures are for ours. Everyone, as they are bound to preserve themselves and not to abandon their position willfully, should, by the same reasoning, when their own preservation is not at stake, strive as much as they can to preserve the rest of humanity, and may not, unless it is to administer justice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what contributes to the preservation of life, liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

Section 7. To ensure that everyone is prevented from infringing on others' rights and from causing harm to one another, and to uphold the law of nature, which desires peace and the preservation of all humanity, the enforcement of the law of nature is, in that state, entrusted to every individual. This means that everyone has the right to punish those who violate this law to the extent necessary to prevent its breach. For the law of nature, like all other laws concerning people in this world, would be futile if there were no one in the state of nature with the power to enforce it, thereby protecting the innocent and restraining offenders. If anyone in the state of nature can punish another for any wrongdoing, then everyone can do so. In this state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, whatever one person may do in enforcing that law, everyone must necessarily have the right to do.

Section 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one person gains power over another; but not absolute or arbitrary power to treat a criminal, once captured, according to their own passionate impulses or limitless whims. Instead, they can only impose what calm reason and conscience dictate as proportionate to the offense, which should serve for reparation and restraint. These are the only justifications for one person to lawfully harm another, which we call punishment. By breaking the law of nature, the offender shows they live by a rule other than reason and common fairness, which is the standard God has set for human actions for their mutual security. Thus, they become a threat to humanity, as they disregard and break the bond meant to protect against injury and violence. This act is a violation against the entire human race and its peace and safety, as provided by the law of nature. Therefore, every person, by their right to preserve humanity in general, may restrain or, when necessary, destroy harmful things. They may bring such consequences upon anyone who has broken that law to make them regret their actions and deter them, and by their example, others, from committing similar harm. In this situation, and on this basis, every person has a right to punish the offender and be the executioner of the law of nature.

Section 9. I have no doubt that this will seem like a very strange doctrine to some people, but before they condemn it, I ask them to explain to me by what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish a foreigner, for any crime they commit in their country. It is certain that their laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the declared will of the legislative, do not apply to a stranger: they do not address him, nor, if they did, is he obligated to listen to them. The legislative authority, by which they are enforced over the subjects of that commonwealth, has no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England, France, or Holland, are to an Indian, just like the rest of the world, people without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every person does not have the power to punish offenses against it, as they reasonably judge the case to require, I do not see how the magistrates of any community can punish a foreigner from another country, since, in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every person naturally may have over another.

Section 10. Besides the crime of breaking the law and deviating from the right rule of reason, which causes a person to become degenerate and abandon the principles of human nature, becoming a harmful creature, there is usually an injury done to someone, and another person suffers damage from this transgression. In such cases, the person who has suffered damage has, in addition to the right to punishment shared with others, a specific right to seek reparation from the one who caused it. Any other person who finds it just may also join with the injured party and assist in recovering from the offender enough to compensate for the harm suffered.

Section 11. From these two distinct rights, one being the right to punish a crime for the sake of restraint and preventing similar offenses—which is a right held by everyone—and the other being the right to seek reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, it follows that the magistrate, who as a magistrate has the common right of punishing entrusted to them, can often, when the public good does not require the execution of the law, forgive the punishment of criminal offenses by their own authority. However, they cannot forgive the compensation owed to any private individual for the damage they have suffered. The person who has suffered the damage has the right to demand this in their own name, and only they can forgive it. The injured person has the power to claim the goods or services of the offender by right of self-preservation, just as every person has the power to punish a crime to prevent its recurrence, by the right they have to preserve all humanity and do all reasonable things to achieve that end. Thus, every person, in the state of nature, has the power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from committing similar irreparable harm by the example of the punishment that follows from everyone, and also to protect people from the attempts of a criminal who, having renounced reason—the common rule and measure God has given to humanity—has, through unjust violence and murder, declared war against all humanity, and therefore may be destroyed like a lion or a tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom people can have no society or security. This is the basis of that great law of nature: Whoever sheds human blood, by humans shall their blood be shed. Cain was so fully convinced that everyone had the right to destroy such a criminal that after the murder of his brother, he cried out, "Everyone who finds me will slay me," so clearly was it written in the hearts of all humanity.

Section 12. For the same reason, a person in the state of nature may punish minor violations of that law. You might ask, with death? I answer, each transgression can be punished to the extent, and with such severity, as is enough to make it a bad deal for the offender, give them reason to regret, and deter others from doing the same. Every offense that can be committed in the state of nature can also be punished equally in the state of nature, just as it can in a commonwealth. Although it is beyond my current purpose to delve into the specifics of the law of nature or its measures of punishment, it is certain that such a law exists, and it is as understandable and clear to a rational being and a student of that law as the positive laws of commonwealths; perhaps even clearer, as reason is easier to comprehend than the whims and complex schemes of people pursuing conflicting and hidden interests expressed in words. This is truly the case for a large part of the municipal laws of countries, which are only correct insofar as they are based on the law of nature, by which they should be regulated and interpreted.

Section 13. Regarding this unusual idea, namely, that in the state of nature everyone has the executive power of the law of nature, I have no doubt that it will be argued that it is unreasonable for people to be judges in their own cases. Self-love will make people biased towards themselves and their friends, while ill nature, passion, and revenge will lead them to go too far in punishing others. This would result in nothing but confusion and disorder, and therefore, it is believed that God has certainly established government to restrain the partiality and violence of people. I readily agree that civil government is the appropriate solution for the inconveniences of the state of nature, which must indeed be significant, where people can be judges in their own cases. It is easy to imagine that someone who was unjust enough to harm their brother would hardly be just enough to condemn themselves for it. However, I would ask those who raise this objection to remember that absolute monarchs are merely human; and if government is meant to be the remedy for the evils that inevitably arise from people being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is therefore intolerable, I would like to know what kind of government that is, and how much better it is than the state of nature, where one person, commanding a multitude, has the freedom to be judge in their own case and can do whatever they please to all their subjects, without anyone having the slightest liberty to question or control those who carry out their wishes. In whatever they do, whether guided by reason, mistake, or passion, must be accepted? It is much better in the state of nature, where people are not obliged to submit to the unjust will of another; and if someone judges wrongly in their own or any other case, they are accountable for it to the rest of humanity.

Section 14. It is often asked as a major objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer for now, that since all princes and rulers of independent governments all over the world are in a state of nature, it is clear the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are not, in alliance with others: for it is not every agreement that ends the state of nature between men, but only the one where they mutually agree to form one community and create one political body; other promises and agreements men may make with one another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and deals for trade, etc., between the two men on the desert island, mentioned by Garcilaso de la Vega in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America, are binding to them, even though they are perfectly in a state of nature in relation to one another: for truth and keeping faith belong to men, as men, and not as members of society.

Section 15. To those who claim that there were never any people in the state of nature, I will not only counter with the authority of the insightful Hooker, Ecclesiastical Polity, Book I, Section 10, where he states,

The laws that have been mentioned so far, i.e., the laws of nature, bind people absolutely, simply because they are human, even if they have never formed any settled community or made any formal agreements among themselves about what to do or not to do. However, since we are not able by ourselves to provide everything we need for the kind of life our nature desires—a life worthy of human dignity—we are naturally led to seek community and fellowship with others to make up for the deficiencies and imperfections we have when living alone. This was the reason people first united into political societies.

But I also assert that all people are naturally in that state and remain so until they choose to become members of some political society; and I am confident that, as this discussion continues, I will make this very clear.

Chapter 3: On the State of War

Section 16. The state of war is a condition of hostility and destruction. Therefore, when someone declares, through words or actions, a calm and deliberate intention to take another person's life, it places them in a state of war with the person against whom they have declared such an intention. This exposes their life to the other's power to be taken away, either by that person or anyone who joins in their defense and supports their cause. It is reasonable and just that I should have the right to destroy what threatens me with destruction. According to the fundamental law of nature, since humans are to be preserved as much as possible, when not everyone can be saved, the safety of the innocent should be prioritized. One may destroy a person who wages war against them or has shown hostility towards their existence for the same reason they might kill a wolf or a lion. Such individuals are not bound by the common law of reason and follow only the rule of force and violence. Therefore, they can be treated like wild animals, those dangerous and harmful creatures that will surely destroy someone whenever they have the chance.

Section 17. This is why anyone who tries to gain absolute power over another person puts themselves in a state of war with that person. It should be understood as a declaration of intent against their life. I have reason to believe that someone who wants to control me without my consent would treat me however they wished once they had that control, and could even destroy me if they felt like it. No one would want to have absolute power over me unless it was to force me into something against my right to freedom, essentially making me a slave. Being free from such force is the only way to ensure my survival, and reason tells me to view anyone who tries to take away that freedom as an enemy to my survival. Therefore, anyone who attempts to enslave me puts themselves in a state of war with me. In the state of nature, anyone who tries to take away the freedom that belongs to someone must be assumed to have a plan to take away everything else, since that freedom is the foundation of everything else. Similarly, in a society, anyone who tries to take away the freedom of the members of that society or commonwealth must be assumed to intend to take away everything else from them, and should be seen as being in a state of war.

Section 18. This makes it lawful for a person to kill a thief who has not harmed them in any way, nor shown any intention to take their life, beyond using force to gain control over them to take their money or whatever they want; because using force, where they have no right, to gain power over me, regardless of their excuse, gives me no reason to believe that someone who would take away my freedom would not also take everything else once they have control over me. Therefore, it is lawful for me to treat them as someone who has put themselves in a state of war with me, meaning I can kill them if I can; for they justly expose themselves to that risk, whoever starts a state of war and is the aggressor in it.

Section 19. Here we can clearly see the difference between the state of nature and the state of war, which some people have confused, but they are as different as a state of peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and preservation is from a state of hostility, malice, violence, and mutual destruction. People living together according to reason, without a common authority on earth to judge between them, is truly the state of nature. However, the use of force, or the intention to use force, against another person, where there is no common authority on earth to appeal to for help, is the state of war. It is the lack of such an appeal that gives a person the right to engage in war even against an aggressor, even if they are part of the same society and a fellow citizen. For example, a thief, whom I cannot harm except by appealing to the law for having stolen everything I own, I may kill if he attacks me to steal just my horse or coat; because the law, which was created for my protection, where it cannot intervene to secure my life from immediate force, which, if lost, cannot be repaired, allows me to defend myself and grants the right to engage in war, giving me the liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor does not allow time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for a remedy in a situation where the harm may be irreversible. The absence of a common judge with authority puts everyone in a state of nature: force without right, against a person's body, creates a state of war, both where there is, and is not, a common judge.

Section 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ends between those who are in society and are equally subject to the fair judgment of the law on both sides. This is because there is then a remedy available through appeal for the past injury and to prevent future harm. However, where no such appeal exists, as in the state of nature due to the lack of established laws and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war, once begun, continues. The innocent party has the right to destroy the other whenever possible until the aggressor offers peace and seeks reconciliation on terms that can repair any wrongs already done and ensure the innocent party's future safety. Furthermore, even where an appeal to the law and established judges is available, but the remedy is denied through a clear perversion of justice and a blatant twisting of the laws to protect or excuse the violence or injuries of certain individuals or groups, it is difficult to see anything other than a state of war. For wherever violence is used and injury is done, even by those appointed to administer justice, it remains violence and injury, no matter how it is disguised with the name, pretenses, or forms of law. The purpose of the law is to protect and provide justice to the innocent through an unbiased application to all who are subject to it. Wherever that is not genuinely done, war is waged upon the sufferers, who, having no earthly appeal to right their situation, are left with the only remedy in such cases: an appeal to heaven.

Section 21. To avoid this state of war (where there is no appeal except to heaven, and where even the smallest disagreement tends to end, since there is no authority to decide between the disputants) is a major reason why people form societies and leave the state of nature. When there is an authority, a power on earth, from which one can seek relief by appeal, the continuation of the state of war is prevented, and the dispute is resolved by that power. If there had been such a court, a higher authority on earth, to determine the right between Jephthah and the Ammonites, they would never have reached a state of war. But as we see, he was forced to appeal to heaven. "The Lord the Judge," he says, "be judge this day between the children of Israel and the children of Ammon," Judges 11:27. Then, relying on his appeal, he leads his army into battle. Therefore, in such disputes, when the question is asked, who shall be the judge? It cannot mean who shall decide the dispute; everyone knows, as Jephthah tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no judge on earth, the appeal is made to God in heaven. That question then cannot mean who shall judge whether another has put themselves in a state of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephthah did, appeal to heaven in it? Only I can be the judge of that in my own conscience, as I will answer for it, on the great day, to the supreme judge of all people.

Chapter 4: On Slavery

Section 22. The natural liberty of a person is to be free from any higher authority on earth and not to be subject to the will or legislative power of another person, but to be governed only by the law of nature. The liberty of a person in society is to be under no legislative power except that which is established by the consent of the community; nor under the control of any will or restriction of any law, except what that legislative body enacts, according to the trust placed in it. Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert Filmer claims in Observations, A. 55, as a liberty for everyone to do whatever they want, to live as they please, and not be bound by any laws. Instead, the freedom of individuals under government is to have a consistent rule to live by, common to everyone in that society, and created by the legislative power established within it; a liberty to follow my own will in all matters where the rule does not prescribe otherwise; and not to be subject to the inconsistent, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will of another person: just as freedom in nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature.

Section 23. This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so essential to a person's survival and well-being that he cannot give it up without also giving up his preservation and life. Since a person does not have control over his own life, he cannot, through agreement or consent, enslave himself to anyone or place himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another to take his life at will. No one can grant more power than they possess themselves; and someone who cannot take their own life cannot give another power over it. Indeed, if a person has forfeited his own life through some act deserving of death, the one to whom he has forfeited it may (when he has him in his power) choose to delay taking it and use him for his own service, and this does not wrong him: for whenever the burden of his slavery becomes greater than the value of his life, he has the power, by resisting his master's will, to bring about the death he desires.

Section 24. This is the complete condition of slavery, which is simply the ongoing state of war between a lawful conqueror and a captive. If an agreement is made between them, establishing limited power on one side and obedience on the other, the state of war and slavery ends as long as the agreement lasts. As mentioned before, no person can, through an agreement, transfer to another what they do not possess themselves—a power over their own life.

I admit, we see among the Jews, as well as other nations, that people did sell themselves; however, it is clear that this was only for labor, not for slavery: because it is evident, the person sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary, despotic power. The master could not have the power to kill him at any time, since, at a certain time, he was required to release him from service; and the master of such a servant was so far from having arbitrary power over his life that he could not, at will, even injure him, as the loss of an eye or tooth would set him free, as stated in Exodus 21.

Chapter 5: About Property.

Section 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us that once people are born, they have a right to preserve themselves, and consequently to food, drink, and other resources nature provides for their survival; or revelation, which informs us of the grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah and his sons, it is very clear that God, as King David says in Psalm 115:16, has given the earth to the children of men; given it to humanity in common. But assuming this, it seems to some a very great difficulty to understand how anyone could ever come to own anything. I will not be satisfied with simply answering that if it is difficult to establish property rights on the assumption that God gave the world to Adam and his descendants in common, it is impossible for anyone, except for one universal monarch, to have any property if we assume that God gave the world to Adam and his heirs in succession, excluding all others of his descendants. Instead, I will try to show how people might come to have ownership of different parts of what God gave to humanity in common, and that without any explicit agreement among all the commoners.

Section 26. God, who has given the world to people in common, has also given them reason to use it to the best advantage for life and convenience. The earth, and everything in it, is given to people for the support and comfort of their existence. And although all the fruits it naturally produces, and animals it sustains, belong to humanity in common, as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and nobody originally has a private ownership, exclusive of the rest of humanity, in any of them, as they are in their natural state: yet being given for the use of people, there must necessarily be a way to appropriate them somehow, before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular person. The fruit, or game, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e., a part of him, that another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for the support of his life.

Section 27. Although the earth and all lesser creatures are shared among all people, every individual has ownership of their own person: no one else has any right to it but themselves. The labor of their body and the work of their hands, we can say, are rightfully theirs. Whatever they take from the state that nature has provided and left it in, they have mixed their labor with and added something of their own, thereby making it their property. By removing it from the common state nature placed it in, this labor adds something to it that excludes the common rights of others: since this labor is undeniably the property of the laborer, no one else can have a right to what it is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and of equal quality, left in common for others.

Section 28. The person who is nourished by the acorns they picked up under an oak, or the apples they gathered from the trees in the forest, has clearly made them their own. No one can deny that the nourishment belongs to them. I ask then, when did they start to become theirs? When they digested them? When they ate them? When they cooked them? When they brought them home? Or when they picked them up? It is clear that if the initial gathering did not make them theirs, nothing else could. That labor created a distinction between them and the common: it added something more to them than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became their private right. And will anyone say they had no right to those acorns or apples they thus appropriated because they did not have the consent of all humankind to make them theirs? Was it theft to claim for themselves what belonged to everyone in common? If such consent were necessary, humanity would have starved, despite the abundance God had provided. We see in commons, which remain so by agreement, that it is the act of taking any part of what is common and removing it from the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And taking this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus, the grass my horse has eaten; the turf my servant has cut; and the ore I have dug in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others, become my property, without the assignment or consent of anyone. The labor that was mine, removing them from that common state they were in, has established my property in them.

Section 29. If we required the explicit consent of every individual in a community for someone to claim any part of what is shared in common, then children or servants wouldn't be able to cut the meat that their father or master had provided for them without assigning each person their specific portion. Even though the water flowing in the fountain is available to everyone, who can doubt that the water in the pitcher belongs solely to the person who drew it out? Their labor has taken it from the hands of nature, where it was common and belonged equally to all, and has thereby made it their own.

Section 30. Thus, this law of reason makes the deer belong to the Indian who has killed it; it is recognized as his property because he has invested his labor into it, even though it was previously the common right of everyone. Among those considered the civilized part of humanity, who have created and multiplied specific laws to determine ownership, this original law of nature, regarding the beginning of property in what was once common, still applies. By this principle, any fish someone catches in the ocean, that vast and still shared resource of humanity, or any ambergris someone collects, becomes their property through the labor that removes it from the common state nature left it in. Even among us, the hare that someone is hunting is considered theirs while they pursue it during the chase: because it is still viewed as common and not anyone's private possession. Whoever has invested effort to find and chase it has thereby removed it from the state of nature, where it was common, and has begun to establish ownership.

Section 31. It might be argued that if collecting acorns or other fruits of the earth, etc., grants a right to them, then anyone could hoard as much as they want. To this, I respond: Not so. The same law of nature that grants us property also limits that property. God has given us all things abundantly, as stated in 1 Timothy 6:12, which is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But to what extent has He given it to us? To enjoy. As much as anyone can use to benefit their life before it spoils, they may, through their labor, establish a property in. Anything beyond this is more than their share and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for humans to spoil or destroy. Considering the abundance of natural provisions that existed for a long time in the world, the few consumers, and how little of that provision one person's efforts could monopolize to the detriment of others—especially when staying within the reasonable limits of what might serve their use—there was little room for disputes or conflicts over property so established.

Section 32. But the main aspect of property now is not the fruits of the earth and the animals that live on it, but the earth itself, as it encompasses and includes everything else. I believe it is clear that property in land is acquired in the same way as other forms of property. As much land as a person tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the produce of, that much is his property. Through his labor, he essentially encloses it from the common. It does not undermine his right to claim that everyone else has an equal claim to it; therefore, he cannot appropriate or enclose it without the consent of all his fellow commoners, all of humanity. When God gave the world in common to all mankind, He also commanded man to labor, and the scarcity of his condition required it of him. God and his reason instructed him to subdue the earth, meaning to improve it for the benefit of life, and to invest something of his own into it, his labor. Whoever, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby attached to it something that was his property, which another had no right to and could not take from him without causing harm.

Section 33. This act of claiming any piece of land by improving it did not harm anyone else, since there was still plenty left, and just as good, more than those who hadn't yet acquired any could use. In reality, there was never less available for others because someone enclosed a part for themselves: for someone who leaves as much as another can use is essentially taking nothing at all. No one could feel wronged by another person drinking, even if they took a large gulp, when there was a whole river of the same water left to quench their thirst: and the situation with land and water, when there is enough of both, is exactly the same.

Section 34. God gave the world to humanity in common; but since He gave it for their benefit and to provide the greatest conveniences of life they could derive from it, it cannot be assumed that He intended for it to always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it for the use of the industrious and rational, with labor being their claim to it, not for the whims or greed of the quarrelsome and contentious. Anyone who had as much left for their own improvement as was already taken up had no reason to complain and should not interfere with what had already been improved by someone else's labor. If they did, it is clear they desired the benefit of another's efforts, which they had no right to, rather than the land God had given them in common with others to work on, where there was as much available as was already possessed, and more than they knew what to do with or their industry could manage.

Section 35. In England, or any other country where there is a government, a lot of people, money, and trade, it's true that no one can enclose or claim any part of common land without the agreement of all the other commoners. This is because the land is kept common by agreement, meaning by the law of the land, which must not be broken. Even though it is common for some people, it is not common to all of humanity; instead, it is the shared property of that country or parish. Moreover, after such an enclosure, the remaining land would not be as beneficial to the other commoners as the whole was when everyone could use it entirely. In contrast, at the beginning of the world, when it was first populated, things were different. The law that people were under then was more about claiming ownership. God commanded, and people's needs forced them to work. What they worked on became their property, as it couldn't be taken from them once they had invested their labor in it. Thus, subduing or cultivating the earth and having control over it were connected. One gave the right to the other. So, by commanding people to subdue the earth, God gave them the authority to claim ownership to some extent. The nature of human life, which requires labor and resources to work with, naturally leads to private ownership.

Section 36. Nature has set the measure of property by the extent of human labor and the necessities of life: no one’s labor could conquer or claim everything, nor could their consumption use up more than a small portion. Thus, it was impossible for anyone to infringe upon another's rights or acquire property to the detriment of their neighbor, who would still have enough room for an equally good and large possession (even after the other had taken their share) as before it was claimed. This measure limited each person's possession to a very moderate amount, which they could claim without harming anyone, in the early ages of the world, when people were more likely to get lost by wandering away from their group in the vast wilderness of the earth, rather than being cramped for space to cultivate. And this same measure can still be allowed without harming anyone, even as full as the world seems: for if we imagine a person or family in the state they were in when the world was first populated by the children of Adam or Noah, and let them settle in some inland, unoccupied areas of America, we would find that the possessions they could claim, based on the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor, even today, harm the rest of humanity, or give them reason to complain or feel wronged by this person’s encroachment, even though the human race has now spread to all corners of the world and far exceeds the small number it was at the beginning. In fact, the extent of land is of so little value without labor, that I have heard it said that in Spain, a person may be allowed to plow, sow, and reap without being disturbed on land they have no other claim to, except for their use of it. On the contrary, the locals feel grateful to the person who, through their industry on neglected and thus waste land, has increased the supply of corn, which they needed. But regardless of this, which I do not emphasize, I confidently assert that the same rule of property, namely, that everyone should have as much as they can make use of, would still hold true in the world without restricting anyone; since there is enough land in the world to support double the population, had not the invention of money and the unspoken agreement of people to assign value to it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall soon explain in more detail.

Section 37. It is certain that in the beginning, before the desire for more than what one needed had changed the intrinsic value of things—which depends solely on their usefulness to human life—or before it was agreed that a small piece of yellow metal, which could last without wasting or decaying, should be worth more than a large piece of meat or a whole heap of grain; even though people had the right to claim, through their labor, as much of nature's resources as they could use for themselves, this could not be much, nor would it harm others, as there was still plenty left for those willing to put in the same effort. Additionally, when someone claims land for themselves through their labor, they do not decrease but rather increase the common wealth of humanity: because the provisions that support human life, produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak conservatively) ten times more than what an acre of equally rich land left uncultivated would yield. Therefore, someone who encloses land and gains more conveniences of life from ten acres than they could from a hundred left to nature, can truly be said to give ninety acres back to humanity: for their labor now provides them with provisions from ten acres, which would have otherwise required a hundred acres left in common. I have estimated the improved land very modestly, suggesting its productivity is only ten times greater, when it is actually much closer to a hundred times greater: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and uncultivated wastelands of America, left to nature without any improvement, farming, or cultivation, a thousand acres provide the needy and impoverished inhabitants with as many conveniences of life as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire, where they are well cultivated?

Before land was claimed as private property, anyone who gathered as much wild fruit or hunted, caught, or tamed as many animals as they could, and anyone who worked on any of nature's spontaneous products to change them from their natural state by applying their labor, gained ownership of them. However, if these items spoiled while in their possession without being used properly—if the fruits rotted or the meat decayed before they could consume it—they violated the common law of nature and were subject to punishment. They encroached on their neighbor's share, for they had no right to more than what they could use, and these resources were meant to provide them with life's necessities.

Section 38. The same principles applied to the ownership of land: whatever a person tilled and harvested, stored, and used before it spoiled, that was his own right; whatever he enclosed and could feed, and make use of, the animals and produce were also his. But if the grass within his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of his planting perished without being gathered and stored, this part of the earth, despite his enclosure, was still considered waste and could be claimed by anyone else. Thus, in the beginning, Cain could take as much land as he could till and make it his own, while still leaving enough for Abel's sheep to graze on; a few acres would suffice for both their needs. But as families grew and their industrious efforts increased their wealth, their possessions expanded with their needs; yet it was often without any fixed ownership of the land they used, until they formed communities, settled together, and built cities. Then, by mutual agreement, they eventually established the boundaries of their distinct territories and agreed on limits with their neighbors; and by laws among themselves, they settled the properties of those within the same society. For we see that in the part of the world which was first inhabited, and therefore likely to be most populated, even as late as Abraham's time, people wandered with their flocks and herds, which were their wealth, freely moving about; and this Abraham did in a land where he was a stranger. From this, it is clear that at least a large portion of the land was held in common; the inhabitants did not value it or claim ownership of any more than they used. But when there was not enough space in the same area for their herds to graze together, they separated and expanded their pasture by mutual agreement, as Abraham and Lot did in Genesis 13:5. For the same reason, Esau left his father and brother and settled in Mount Seir, as mentioned in Genesis 36:6.